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ON THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM IN JURISPRUDENCE: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LEITER 
 
Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora 
In a recent paper, Professor Brian Leiter has urged legal philosophers to abandon the quest 
for the specification of differences between law and morality —that he calls “Demarcation 
Problem in Jurisprudence. 1 Leiter diagnoses that of such problem is the main concern of 
legal philosophy,2 and that the legal positivist solution, an account of the nature of law in 
terms of set of essential and necessary conditions, is the best answer available for it. 
However, this project is destined to fail, in his view, because artefacts like law are resistant 
to analysis such essentialist terms. The core piece of his argument is drawn upon from 
analogy to the similar Demarcation Problem in philosophy of science, where the quest for 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguishes science (another artefact) 
from pseudo-science was also proposed as a major theoretical concern, and also failed 
spectacularly. This rejection forces us, Leiter suggests, to change the approach from a purely 
theoretical to a practical one. Since the whole point of the solving Demarcation Problem is 
in fact the practical concern of guiding the action of legal officials and citizens, jurisprudents 
should follow the example philosophers of science who has abandoned the conceptual 
quest for a demarcation criterion and, alternatively, have attempted to solve directly 
practical questions concerning epistemic guidance. Hence, instead of continuing to pursue 
the futile project of demarcating law from morality; he proposes that legal philosophers 
should tackle directly, without any jurisprudential dressing, the questions about what ought 
to be done in legal cases.  
                                                     
1 Brian Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 21, no. 1 (2011): 1–15 (henceforth, “Demarcation”).  
2 For stylistic reasons, I will use the expressions legal philosophy and jurisprudence interchangeably. In section 
II.1, I discuss some aspects of about the object of study of jurisprudence.  
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My principal aim in this paper is to provide the compliment of a detailed response Leiter’s 
powerful and provoking position. Although I concur with his rejection of the Demarcation 
Problem, I have quarrels with his diagnosis, his criticism of the positivist position and his 
positive argument for a more practical approach to jurisprudence. Even when at the end I 
would a knockdown argument against Leiter’s position, if I could highlight the value of his 
real contribution and the avenues available for the legal philosopher, we would made a 
small step in our way to a deeper and clearer understanding of the agenda of jurisprudence.  
I. Leiter’s Argument 
1. Diagnosis: The Demarcation Problem and the Positivist Position 
Leiter’s sceptic case against the Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence can be roughly 
reconstructed in three steps.  In the first step, he defines the Problem and the Positivist 
Solution.  The Demarcation Problem is concerned “with specifying the differences between 
two systems of normative guidance that are omnipresent in all modern human societies: 
law and morality.”3 This problem has constituted, Leiter diagnoses, “the dominant problem 
in jurisprudence”4 during the last century. This problem has been particularly pressing for 
the legal positivists –the tradition of legal though which traditionally has been defined as 
holding that there are no necessary connections between law and morality (Kelsen and 
Hart’s version), that there are no necessary moral constrains to legality (Raz’s exclusive 
version) or that there exist some at least some conceptually possible legal systems in which 
morality does not constrain legality (in some standard “inclusive” or “incorporationist” 
versions). Although he acknowledges that the Demarcation Problem is not exclusive of the 
                                                     
3 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 2. 
4 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
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legal positivism,5 Leiter focuses only on the positivist attempt to solve it, as it is the “the 
most powerful and successful analysis of law”6 that we have.  
The typical solution that major legal positivists have provided to the Demarcation Problem, 
Leiter notes quoting Hart, requires an account of the “nature (or the essence) of law.”7 More 
recent solutions, such as those advocated by Shapiro or Dickson, require a more precise and 
more metaphysically robust result. For instance, Shapiro claims that the purpose of 
jurisprudence is to “supply the set of properties that make (possible or actual) instances of 
‘law’ the things that they are”, in the same way that H2O is “what makes water water:” “The 
answer to the question ‘What is law?,’” Shapiro says, is “to discover what makes all and only 
instances of law instances of law and not something else instances of law instances of law 
                                                     
5 Leiter also makes clear that the Demarcation Problem also affects natural lawyers, the competing theory to 
legal positivism, and what I will later in this paper call “non-positivists.” On the natural law side, Leiter claims 
that natural lawyers such as John Finnis and Mark Murphy presents themselves as also solving the problem, 
but they end up with a very different solution: they try to explain what morally good law, practically 
reasonable, or non-defective law is.  Since they do not account what law is, but what law should be or why we 
should obey it, he regards the natural law solution to the Demarcation Problem a “transparent change of 
subject”. Ibid., 15. Natural lawyers have strenuously denied such characterization of their project. See, Mark 
C. Murphy, “The Explanatory Role of the Weak Natural Law Thesis,” in Philosophical Foundations of the Nature 
of Law, ed. Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3–21.) On the non-
positivist side, Leiter points that Dworkin’s law-as-integrity theory, which advocates a direct connection 
between jurisprudence and moral and political philosophy, could be read as an attempt, not to solve, but to 
“dissolve” the Demarcation Problem. Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 15. 
6 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 7. 
7 Hart, The Concept of Law, 6; cited in Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 3. What Leiter does not note is Hart 
presents the question of the “what is nature of essence of essence of law?” as an “obscurely framed” 
transformation of the more general question “what is the law?” As we will see later, some authors will claim 
that we should not take literally Hart’s appeal to law’s nature or essence.  
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and not something else” and to “discover the law’s nature” is also to “discover its necessary 
properties, i.e., those properties that law could not fail to have.”8 Such project is the main 
object of Leiter’s criticism. He claims that philosophers on other fields will find “striking” 
and “wholly incredible” that 21st legal philosophers still be in the business of providing their 
solution to the Demarcation Problem in such terms of “identify[ing] the ‘necessary’ and 
‘essential’ properties of law that distinguish it from morality in all cases.”9 This out-dated 
and unsuccessful project should be laid to rest.  
2. Criticism: The Futility of Demarcations in Science and Law 
In the second step, Leiter substantiates his objection against the futile positivist’s solution 
to the Demarcation Problem. His case begins with the undeniable claim that law is an 
artefact concept, that is, a thing “that necessarily owes its existence to human activities 
intended to create that artefact.”10 But artefacts, Leiter argues, are “notoriously resistant 
to analysis in terms of essential and necessary conditions”11 for at two least reasons: on the 
other hand, artefacts, unlike natural phenomena like “water” or “tiger, “cannot be 
individuated by their natural properties.”12 Artefact can have different constitutions or 
structure (e.g., chairs can be made of stone, metal, etc.; with or without arms, etc.), its 
putative function can be performed by other things (e.g., people can sit in boxes, steps, 
etc.), and some examples of the artefacts do not perform their function (e.g., ornamental 
                                                     
8 Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8–9. A much similar statement is 
found in Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 17. 
9 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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chairs). On the other hand, since artefacts are “hostage to changing human ends and 
purposes”, the evolution of human ends and attributes entails that artefacts has no 
essential attributes at all. This clearly precludes the project of analyzing artefacts in terms 
of essential and necessary conditions. Then, “if, in the history of philosophy”, Leiter 
emphatically suggests, “there is not a single successful analysis of the ‘necessary’ or 
‘essential’ properties of a human artefact, why should we think law will be different?”13  
But the crucial argument against the positivist’s solution to the problem in terms of essential 
and necessary conditions is drawn from an analogy from philosophy of science, where 
similar Demarcation Problem occupied the substantial theoretical attention during the 20th 
century.14 This Demarcation Problem is concerned with demarcating between 
“epistemically reliable forms of inquiry” (i.e., science, “perhaps the most important and 
transformative human artefact of recorded history”15) from the “epistemically unreliable 
ones” (i.e., pseudo-science or non-sense) and it was a problem that occupied that attention 
of major philosophers of science, including Popper, Carnap and Hempel, amongst other 
luminaries.16 Leiter points, supported in Larry Laudan’s famous study of this question,17 that 
philosophers of science attempted exactly the same project of providing a set of essential 
and necessary conditions that specifies the differences science from non-science, and, more 
importantly, that they “failed spectacularly” in doing so. Laudan’s sceptic case against the 
                                                     
13 Ibid., 7–8. 
14 This analogy is not a surprise.  
15 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 8.  
16 Ibid., 5–6. 
17 Larry Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” in Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Robert S. Cohen and Larry Laudan, vol. 76 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1983), 111–127.  
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Demarcation Problem in science is focused in the two most recent attempted solutions to 
the problem: The Logical Positivists’ “Verificationism” and “Popper’s “Falsifiabilism”. 
Verificationism, the view holding that only empirical verifiable propositions are meaningful, 
fails, because many statements in sciences are no verifiable (e.g., universal laws), while 
many false statements are (e.g., the flatness of earth could be “verified” with some 
proofs).18 Popper’s falsability-based theory fails because it cannot account “singular 
existential statements” (e.g., “there exist a Black Hole”) and it considers “scientific” “every 
crank claim which makes ascertainably false assertions”19. Laudan claims that, as noted by 
Leiter, although argument is not conclusive against the possibility of demarcating, the fact 
no demarcation criterion offered so far can fulfill its promise of providing a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions that distinguishes scientific activities from non-scientific one 
means that demarcation is a futile quest that should be abandoned.20 
For Leiter, like in philosophy of science, the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence is also 
destined to failed because there does not exhibit any successful analysis of the essential 
and necessary conditions of law that distinguishes from morality. Leiter mentions that 
Hart’s theory of the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for the legal system in terms a set 
of primary rules (obeyed by the citizens) and secondary rules (accepted, from the internal 
point of view, by the officials) as the necessary and sufficient conditions runs into well-
known troubles as a solution to the Demarcation Problem: “Can there not be legal system 
                                                     
18 Ibid., 120–1.  
19 Ibid., 121.  
20 Ibid., 124. It should be noted that Laudan’s conclusion is much strong than what Leiter notes. For Laudan: 
“The [demarcation] question “is both uninteresting and, judging by its checkered past, intractable. If we would 
stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ 
from our vocabulary”. Ibid., 125. 
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in which the official are motivated by merely self-interesting concerns…? Can the idea of 
rule of recognition really account for the reasoning of common-law courts interpreting 
precedents?”21 Moreover, he notes that there are substantial disagreements among major 
legal theorist about which are the necessary and essential conditions of law: Hart holds that 
the “rule of recognition” is merely a social rule, so its content is fixed by whatever the 
practice of officials in a particular legal system is, including moral ones; Raz states that the 
practice constituting the rule of recognition cannot appeal to moral criteria, since they are 
inconsistent with law’s claim to authority; Shapiro agrees with Raz’s rejection of moral 
criteria, but for different reasons (its inconsistency not with law’s authority, but with law’s 
guidance of conduct); Waluchow disagrees with Shapiro and Raz and defends Hart’s 
position. 22 And so on. For Leiter, the fact we cannot achieve the desired agreement leaves 
an important lesson for the philosopher of law:  
If hundreds, perhaps thousands, of philosophers in the last century… could not specify the 
essential and necessary features of science… should we really hold out hope that an analysis of law 
will yield ‘necessary’ and ‘essential’ criteria, that is, criteria that will classify every norm in either 
the ‘legal’ or the ‘non-legal’ camp?’23 
This claim, like Laudan’s, this is far from constituting “a conclusive refutation” of the 
Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. But it since it shows the futility for the positivist 
quest, Leiter feels entitled should move to different questions about the practical relevance 
of solving the problem. This is the third argumentative step.  
3. Positive Proposal: A Practical Jurisprudence 
In this final step, Leiter invites to follow again Laudan’s lead in philosophy of science. 
According to Laudan, the futility of the Demarcation Problem should lead us to think in the 
                                                     
21 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 7. 
22 Ibid., 7–8. 
23 Ibid., 8. 
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different question: “Why does this solving question matter?”24 He notes that people have 
attempted to solve the problem because they though its solution have an important 
practical consequence: a demarcation “criterion will serve as a rationale for taking a number 
of practical actions which may well have far-reaching moral, social and economic 
consequences”.25 As Leiter put is, the Demarcation problem is a problem in theoretical 
rationality (about what “we ought to believe”) that has important consequences in our 
practical reason (“since what we know affects we think ought to be done”).26 What other 
philosophers of science were doing by solving the Demarcation, in Leiter’s reconstruction 
of Laudan’s position, was attempting to create a “shortcut” to those practical questions. 27 
However, since the current inexistence of such shortcuts renders the project in a pointless 
one, we should better concentrate our attention “on the epistemology of various sciences, 
from physics to biology, and whether their distinctive claims are well supported by the 
available evidence.”28 The relevant question is not “what makes a belief scientific?” but 
                                                     
24 Ibid., 6, 9–10. 
25 Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” 120. 
26 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 9. I should add that perhaps the best example of the practical difference of 
the solution to the Demarcation Problem is the debate about Intelligent Design in Public school. If we can 
differentiate valid knowledge from pseudo-science, we will be in a better solution to respond whether 
Intelligent Design is science (or a good example of science), and thus is apt for being taught in public schools. 
For Laudan’s well-discussed thoughts on this problem, see Larry Laudan, “Commentary: Science at the Bar--
Causes for Concern,” Science, Technology & Human Values 7, no. 4 (1982): 16–19. 
27 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 7. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
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instead “what makes a belief well-founded?”29 The latter is the practical, tractable and 
interesting question in which according to Laudan philosophers of science should focus.  
 Leiter devotes a substantial part (almost half of this paper) of his paper to adapt Laudan’s 
lesson to jurisprudence. However, beyond of the important point that “the main practical 
rationale for solving the Demarcation Problem we have identified” is “that the correct or 
incorrect view about legality will affect action30”; most of his discussion, as he describes it 
in the abstract, “becomes embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculation about the effects of 
jurisprudential doctrines on behaviour”31. For I will largely ignore these considerations in 
this exposition of his argument, and I will move directly to the crucial element of the third 
step, namely, his positive proposal about the utility of jurisprudence. Leiter thinks that 
philosophers of law act on the “illusion” that a solution to the Demarcation Problem gives 
an answer to the “hard practical questions” about the relationships between law and 
morality: 
Law and morality… are pervasive normative phenomena in modern societies. We generally believe 
that judges have a defeasible obligation to apply the law; we also generally believe that judges, 
like other persons, ought to do what is morally right. These two normative demands can conflict, 
and then there can be hard practical questions to answer.32 
The “illusion” is that positivist solution in terms of analysis terms of essential and sufficient 
conditions attempt provide shortcut to obtain the answer to such hard practical questions.  
However, the desired theoretical shortcuts are not only inexistent, but also they also 
uninformative about our “particular legal systems and the practical demands they make 
                                                     
29 Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” 125. 
30 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 12 
31 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 1 (abstract). 
32 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 12–3. 
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upon officials”.33 Solving the Demarcation Problem does not inform what citizens and 
judges ought to do in legal cases, e.g., they do not help us to solve the controversy about 
the meaning of the constitution and originalism,34 and about the constitutionality of the 
death penalty in US, whose constitution forbids ‘cruel and unusual punishment’.35 Since 
they shortcuts do not work, we should abandon the “jurisprudential dressing” than that 
positivist wants to give to the solution to such practical question. Instead, we should “tackle 
the practical questions directly”,36, that is, we should ask ourselves if judges are morally 
justified in applying the original public meaning in resolving concrete controversies or if 
what is the moral status of death penalty. Concisely put, Leiter positive proposal is the 
following: like the philosopher of science who abandons the Demarcation Problem for 
concentrating his attention in the particular epistemology of the various sciences, Leiter 
should that the jurisprudent should “abandon the Demarcation Problem in favour of 
arguing about what ought to be done, whether by judges confronted with novel cases, or 
citizens confronted with morally objectionable laws.”37 
At the end, Leiter is not fully confident that this will be the route that jurisprudence will 
take, as the professionalization of philosophical debates “run the risk of generating both an 
audience and performers for ultimately pointless disputes.”38 But, in the “spirit” of the 
famous Marx’s second thesis on Feuerbach, according to which “a dispute… that is isolated 
                                                     
33 Ibid., 13. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 14. 
36 Ibid., 13. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Ibid. 
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from practice is a purely scholastic question”39, he offers confidently his conclusion: Though 
there were for reason for the Demarcation Problem to be important for 20th- century 
positivism, we do not have such excuses today. 
II. Responses 
1. The Problem of Jurisprudence 
Although Leiter is correct in that his conclusion about the rejection the Demarcation 
Problem in Jurisprudence, there are some important flaws in this argument. The first one 
concerns with the diagnosis he provides about the main problem of jurisprudence and its 
solutions. He argues in his first argumentative step, offering substantial textual evidence 
from the major works of leading positivists, that the Demarcation Problem has been “the 
Problem of Jurisprudence”. Under this reading, major legal theories are nothing more than 
mere as responses to such crucial concern. I have several doubts about the diagnosis and 
the way it frames the agenda of jurisprudence.  
First off, it is not fully clear what Leiter means by his diagnosis, how is it different from other 
jurisprudential claims (in particular, from the “Separation Thesis”), and, how literal should 
we take that statement, specially coming from one of the main participants of the meta-
jurisprudential debates. Surely, there is something problematic in claiming that 
“demarcating” is the problem of jurisprudence or to any area philosophy or research. 
Demarcating is, in principle, to provide negative claims (i.e., roughly, to say it what X is not), 
which are unsafe places to define our areas of research or ground our theories, and, in many 
cases, they are so weak that they are unable to provide useful guides to establish competing 
positions. For example, to revert the claim, it would be ludicrous to say the purpose of 
                                                     
39 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to 
The Critique of Political Economy (New York: Prometheus Books, 1976), 569; cited in Leiter, “Demarcation 
Problem,” 15. 
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ethical theory is to demarcate morality from law. The pursue of more positive claims 
normally defines areas of conceptual research about that an account, an explanation n 
elucidation of the thing (i.e., roughly, to say what X is). This distinction between negative 
and positive claims can be exemplified wit he characterization that Leiter’s makes of 
philosophy of science in other paper: Leiter does not claim that the Problem of philosophy 
of science consists in demarcating science a theory that “describe and assess (in epistemic 
terms) the ‘methods; scientists employ to discover truths about the world” and that is able 
“determine the ontological commitments scientific theories actually do have, or ought to 
have”.40  
Similarly, it can be expected that the proper problem of jurisprudence is to be defined in 
more positive terms. In this sense, Leiter’s diagnosis is clearly ignoring many explicit attempt 
of such authors for creating theories of law’s existence, law’s validity, the conditions of 
existence of legal systems, the study of legal norms or legal statements, etc. which are not 
reducible or equivalent to solving the question of demarcation. More problematically, Leiter 
it is violating his own statements about the relevant desiderata about a legal theory. In 
other place, he presented jurisprudence, or “the philosophical questions of law”, an are 
area which (i) “studies, elucidates and perhaps critiques or revises the methods used by 
lawyers and judges to ‘discover’ legal conclusions” and which (ii) “examines the ontological 
commitments actually manifest in the law or that ought to be part of our conception of 
law”.41 He also suggested a list of the “classic questions of philosophy of law” (“what is law? 
what is the relationship between legal norms and other norms in society? how do judges 
                                                     
40 Brian Leiter, “Is There an American Jurisprudence?,” in Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal 
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 84. 
41 Ibid. Leiter’s formulation is slightly different from the traditional ones, as Leiter is concerned in including 
legal realism as form of jurisprudence.  In any case, Leiter position aptly describes in what is commonly known 
as conceptual jurisprudence, as opposed to normative theories. 
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decide cases and how ought they to decide them? are legal norms authoritative (do they 
give rise to special obligations or reasons for action? what are the legitimate sources of 
law?”)42, where only one seems to bear some relationships with the problem of 
“demarcating” law from morality. It is apparent that Leiter’s diagnosis, taken literally, it is 
not satisfactory. 
The source for the misguided diagnosis is Leiter’s his effort for connecting philosophy of law 
and philosophy of science. He has previously stated that jurisprudence is “most helpfully 
thought of on the model of philosophy of science”43, and he has not concealed that the 
paper under discussion “owes its existence to a conversation with Larry Laudan, many years 
ago”.44 However, this effort is too strained, as there are important disanalogies between 
the Demarcations in science and law: while in principle a proposition cannot be time science 
and pseudo-science at the same; the shared legal and moral prohibitions against murder, 
theft, rape and others shows that certain requirements can be both moral and at the same 
time. This is why Leslie objects Leiter’s presentation claiming that no sensible legal 
philosopher, today or thirty years ago, “is looking for properties of law that will ‘distinguish 
it from morality in all cases.’”45 It should also be noted that the desired criteria of 
demarcation are very different. As Green remarks, the demarcation problem in science is 
supposed requires a solution that is both conceptual and normative (that is, that helps to 
distinguish science from non-science, but also, science from pseudo-science or bad science), 
whereas in jurisprudence only the conceptual role is needed (there is no clear equivalent to 
                                                     
42 Ibid., 83. 
43 Ibid., 84. 
44 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 1 (footnote). 
45 Leslie Green, The Morality in Law, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
February 24, 2013), 36, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2223760. 
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pseudo-law).46 And to be clear, this conceptual role is the one that jurisprudents have 
attributed to the rule of recognition. I believe Green’s point can be used justifies the 
difference in the strength of the result science and law. Whereas Laudan asks to eliminate 
“pseudo-science” and ‘unscientific’ from our scientific vocabulary (the normative 
elements);47 it would be absolutely ludicrous for the legal philosopher to say she will 
eliminate “moral” or “non-legal” from the jurisprudential vocabulary.48 
2. Alternatives available to the legal positivist project 
Let us turn now our attention to the strongest piece of Leiter’s argument: The argument 
about the futility of the positivist’s solution to the Demarcation Problem, that he presents 
in his second argumentative step.49 He finds “striking” and “wholly incredible” that 21st 
century legal philosophers still conceive their projects as providing the “necessary” and 
“essential” properties of law that distinguish it from morality in all cases. His case has two 
parts. On the one hand, Leiter claims that the project is impossible, because artefacts like 
law or science are resistant to analysis such type of analysis terms. On the other hand, the 
central piece of his argument, this futility is also exemplified by the failure of the similar 
Demarcation Problem in philosophy of science. Leiter does not claim to present a decisive 
refutation, but instead, like Laudan, he suggests that the failure of the best existing 
attempts counts as reading to abandon the project. It should be apparent that the objective 
of Leiter’s criticism in this step is not the enterprise for looking for the nature of law, but 
                                                     
46 Ibid., 37–8. 
47 Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” 125. 
48 In order to shorten the paper, I have set aside a rather long discussion dispelling of some historical doubts 
about the proper object of jurisprudence and proposing some alternative views.  
49 Henceforth, I am going to read the argument as completely independent from the diagnosis. 
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the more particular project of account for such nature in terms of “necessary and essential 
conditions” (or Classic Conceptual Analysis). 
I believe that Leiter’s argument succeeds in great extent in his rejection of classic conceptual 
analysis, but also involves an important failure. It should be noted that, despite the 
disanalogies between science and law that we noted in the previous section, the objections 
constitute a nice illustration of the weakness of the classic conceptual strategy. Leiter 
position is very close to what have been called in theory of concepts “Plato’s Problem,” a 
traditional objection against the simple forms of conceptual analysis.50 In the same that the 
failure of several Platonic dialogues where Socrates attempts a conceptual analysis of some 
important concepts (such as “friendship” in Lysis, courage in “Laches”, piety in “Euthyphro” 
and knowledge in “Theaetetus”) count as evidence of the overall futility of the enterprise; 
the fact that we cannot provide successful analysis of the of concept of science, and even 
worst, of many artefacts in our ordinary life, rises important doubts about the project that 
we are attempting. One would think that, if classic conceptual analysis were fruitful 
enterprise, there would exist a plethora of successful examples. Yet, as Leiter shows, such 
effective analyses are difficult to find in objects that have some similitudes with law. In this 
sense, we should grant part of Leiter’s argument, and we should pass the burden of the 
classic conceptual analysis to defend his approach.  
However, there is also a substantial problem in this stance. If one were a legal theorist fully 
committed to solving the Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence, should the failure of the 
classic analysis, one of the several alternatives available, counts as reason for abandoning 
the area of research as whole? Surely not. This is a notable flaw, since Leiter has repeatedly 
suggested in his work that classic conceptual analysis and other traditional approaches in 
jurisprudence should be rejected due the advent of more adequate and nuanced 
                                                     
50 See,  
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philosophical position in recent times. If conceptual analysis is an invalid and out-dated, it 
is absolutely natural to look for the valid alternatives.  
There is a small justification for Leiter’s little somewhat justified in some interesting 
features of the current contemporary jurisprudence. On the one hand, where is increasing 
interest –almost an obsession- in conceptual analysis in defending conceptual analysis; This 
interests in almost unanimously premised in an endorsement of the classic structure of 
conceptual analysis, as advocated; on the other hand, there is a clear disconnection 
between this rejection and the more general theories of concept. There are three main 
examples of these connections: Although he named his major work “The Concept of Law”, 
he offered no detailed theories about what he understood as “concept”. The only clear 
methodological guidance that is found in his book is an explicit statement that he is not 
attempting a definition51, but instead the “elucidation of a concept”52. Ken Himma, in his 
spirited defence of conceptual analysis, when he suggests that “the methodology of 
conceptual analysis must be responsive to what a concept is”, and that this involves 
“complex philosophical problems”, he later suggest that the response is “obvious”, 
“concepts are or correspond to mental ingredients needed to think about”, and classic 
conceptual analysis is almost unrivalled as the best alternative.53 Raz, perhaps one of the 
most reflective about the nature of the concepts, have provided his own ad-hoc conceptual 
theory, independent from all cognitive theory, to defend conceptual analysis in 
jurisprudence.  
                                                     
51 Hart, The Concept of Law, chap. 1. 
52 Id. Chap. 10 
53 Michael Freeman, Ross Harrison, and Kenneth E. Himma, eds., “Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual 
Analysis, the Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy,” in Law and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 3–4. 
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The point I want to make is the following: If Leiter is right in his overall denial of classic 
conceptual analysis, it is still possible for jurisprudence to pursue the other alternatives. If 
so, a closer connection between jurisprudence with the general theory of concepts is 
required, and accounts of the metaphysics, methods of analysis, and epistemology of the 
concept of law and legality are needed.54 The jurisprudent should be open the not only the 
other alternatives. Amongst the several options available, the possibility that the concept 
of law should be studied as a cluster concept or prototype theory, as advocated by Schauer, 
Sartorius and Bayle, is especially attractive one. Unfortunately, for reasons of space, I 
cannot present in full such theory. In any case, this is not only to the several possibilities 
available, but also to the more sophisticated possibilities about the existence different 
concepts of law (i.e. conceptual pluralism), the multiplicity of valid analysis applicable in the 
domains of jurisprudence (e.g. that classic conceptual analysis is useful for the general 
concept of law and cluster concepts accounts for the more particular legal concepts, or 
conversely) and the idea that jurisprudence might be done without a concept of law (i.e., 
conceptual eliminativism) or conceptual analysis. It should be apparent that Leiter 
objections had led us to located another challenge for the agenda of jurisprudence: To 
develop a deeper understanding what does it means to have a concept of law or legality. 
3. The Relevance of Jurisprudence 
The last aspect that remains to be scrutinized is Leiter’s third argumentative step, where he 
argues for a positive proposal about the value of jurisprudence. Leiter suggests that the 
Demarcation Problem matters, both in science and law, because it is supposed to provide 
guidance about what people ought to do. More particularly, in jurisprudence, the 
Demarcation Problem is relevant because the correct theory of legality affects the 
behaviour of legal officials and citizens. Since the real relevance of solving the Demarcation 
                                                     
54 Similarly, a better work needs to be done in theory of artefacts.  
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Problem was in a practical one, we should abandon the conceptual enterprises, and focus 
our attention in arguing about judges’ and citizen’s practical problems.  
Here Leiter is taking a position in the debate about the utility or relevance of conceptual 
jurisprudence. He is, on the one hand, rejecting the common view amongst positivists, 
according to which the value of jurisprudence is discovering certain truths about law, and 
obtaining such truths is a sufficient justification for the task, regardless of their connection 
with the legal practice. In lack of a better label, I will simply call it the orthodox position. 
Hart, for example, suggested that “standing need for a form of legal theory…” whose 
perspective is not “what the law requires in particular cases;”55 Bix, claimed that, the point 
of jurisprudence is “no other than knowledge”56 and so have many others.57 The most 
dramatic example of such view comes from Ken Himma, who compares the results of 
jurisprudence with mathematicians’ attempts to solve “the last theorem of Fermat” 58, 
whose solution is a daunting challenge which sheds no light in the real word. Similarly, for 
Himma, the problems with which the jurisprudent deals can be worth solving simply 
because knowing the answer is intrinsically valuable. To be sure, Leiter acknowledges the 
                                                     
55 H. L. A. Hart, “Comment,” in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart, ed. Ruth 
Gavison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 36. 
56 Brian H. Bix, “Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Nature of Jurisprudential Debate,” 
The Canadian Journal of Law Jurisprudence 12 (1999): 24. He later adds: “pleasure from knowledge, from 
uncovering certain kinds of insights about a social practice that may not have been clear to us, though that 
practice has been in front of us all of our lives.” Ibid., 25. 
57 [Cite, Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation; Marmor, Philosophy of Law, Introduction; Green, 25th 
anniversary and Introduction to CL, 3rd, etc.]   
58  Kenneth E. Himma, “Book Review: Substance and Method in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory,” 
Virginia Law Review 88 (2002): 1219–1221. 
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existence such philosophers “figuring out what is true about law”;59 but he deems their 
project as theoretically irrelevant.60 
On the other hand, Leiter seems is closer to the opposite position, which I will call the 
“practical” one, according to which conceptual jurisprudence as advocated by the orthodox 
view is a sterile and impractical tanks, focused in a small set of pointless disputes which only 
interest to “their small group of acolytes.” Many of the defenders of such view follow 
Dworkin and Waldron claiming that, since that adjudication is main problem of 
jurisprudence is, there should be a direct connection between direct connection between 
jurisprudence and legal practice. 61 Others Dworkin-friendly theorist have suggested 
jurisprudence is only an exercise of applied moral and political philosophy to legal cases.  
They also, like Leiter, urge us to tackle the moral and political problems directly. In fairness 
with Leiter, however, it must be noted not only Waldron and Dworkin are unpleasant 
company for him;62 but also that his position is substantially weaker: Leiter does not suggest 
radical transformation jurisprudence in applied moral-political philosophy, nor he argues 
for a direct influence of jurisprudence in legal cases. His position should be read as plea for 
                                                     
59 Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 12. 
60 Ibid., 8 n41. 
61 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 1; Ronald M. Dworkin, ed., 
The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1; Jeremy Waldron, “Hart and the Principles of 
Legality,” in The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
Legal and Political Philosophy, OHLP. 
62 See, his scathing reviews of Dworkin and Waldron’s positions: Brian Leiter, “The End of Empire: Dworkin 
and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century,” Rutgers Law Journal 36 [fall 2004]: 165-81  
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abandoning the futile conceptual part of jurisprudence. In this sense, Leiter is advocating 
the most modest version of the “practical” argument about the utility of philosophy law. 
Despite this weakness, Leiter’s position still is imposing an unhealthy demand of moral and 
political relevance to jurisprudence. As Kevin Toh suggests: “A theory in general 
jurisprudence that is well-developed may or may not have first-order implications, and the 
first-order implications it may have could be quite indirect and may require numerous and 
significant auxiliary hypotheses or theories.” 63 Leiter’s claim that correct theory of legality 
affects the behaviour of legal officials and citizens, is equivalent to, exaggerating Toh’s 
examples, requiring that the correct views of philosophy of mathematics affects our every-
day mathematical thinking, or suggesting that philosophy of language should affects our 
every-day communication.64 It is my view, with Toh and contra Leiter, that there is an 
important part of jurisprudence whose only objective is to account for the idea or concept 
or nature of law or legality, independent of its influence on legal practice, in the same way 
that philosophers of mathematics accounts for the nature of numbers and mathematical 
concepts without affecting our daily mathematical usage. I believe that it is an exaggeration 
to suggest, with Shapiro, that jurisprudence has “profound practical implications for the 
practice of law”65. Legal philosophy influences legal practice only in a small set of very 
difficult cases, 66 and this influence, as Toh suggests, requires the presence of additional 
                                                     
63 See, Kevin Toh, ‘Entrevista’, In Doxa, vo. 35, 2014 (forthcoming some day!).  
64 Id.  
65 Shapiro, Legality, 25; cited in Leiter, “Demarcation Problem,” 9. 
66 It has precisely Brian Leiter who suggested that “theoretical disagreements”, opportunities where 
jurisprudence could provide help in solving legal problems, were in fact rare. Brian Leiter, “Explaining 
Theoretical Disagreement,” The University of Chicago Law Review 76, no. 3 (2009): 1215–1250. I shall not 
pursue this line of criticism here. 
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premises and even complete theories. In any case, achieving practical influence is not the 
main goal of our theorization, but instead these practical consequences should be better 
read as largely unintended consequences of our more general positive views.  
However, the rejection of Leiter’s view does not go all the way to assume the truth of 
orthodox view. Not all true facts are worthy of our time, the utility of philosophy of law is 
not in the aesthetic value of resolving puzzles, and jurisprudence is much more than a 
theoretical divertimento for philosophers and abstract-oriented lawyers. If jurisprudence 
has a value, it seems plausible to suggest that such value is related with the advancement 
of knowledge, broadly construed, useful for other areas of research. This view presupposes 
that human knowledge is a wholly cooperative enterprise and the truths that we obtain in 
one area might help to some truths in others. In this view, philosophy plays a special role of 
accounting for the Aristotelian “first principles” of every area of inquiry: Many of the 
concepts that are used in the different of research are not created by those areas, and they 
involved deeply complex and puzzling elements which are not susceptible to accounts by 
using the methods of the science or experience, and whose only solution lies in pure 
conceptual analysis. In the case of jurisprudence, the main concept that it supposed to 
illuminate is the idea of law (or legality), which is important to many other areas of inquiry. 
It naturally comes to our mind that having a clear concept of law is helpful to sociology, 
political science, anthropology, economy (and forms of economical analysis), some forms 
of historical analysis and other “social areas”, which needs of more than a lexicographical 
definition of law to advance certain some of their theoretical enterprises. In addition, other 
types of normative and critical reflections, and theorizations about particular areas of law 
also rely on a pre-established concept of law. If jurisprudence is unable to provide 
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elucidations that are helpful in other areas to research, it would be better, as Judge Posner 
once suggested, that jurisprudents devote their time “in other socially valuable ways.”67 
Luckily, the way in which this conception of the importance of philosophy works and how it 
can make progress might be exemplified by our more representative theories. Take, for 
instance, Hart’s rejection of Austin’s imperative conception of law. In his rejection the view 
that all laws are commands of a sovereign, Hart made at least two important developments: 
He notes (1) that not every law in the legal system involves a threat, and, (2) that legal 
systems include, in addition to the primary rules that guide the conduct of citizens, 
secondary rules which regulate official behaviour. Those developments might seem 
platitudes for the jurisprudent; but they should have had direct application in other areas: 
there still exist sociological and anthropological approaches that focus only on the primary, 
coercive rules of a society when describing its legal regulations. 68 If they were to accept 
Hart’s developments, they will focus instead in other situations (such as content-
independence) in order to describe the cases of legality they are interested in, and they will 
also note that non-coercive norms are also legal. Those developments might also influence 
the historian, who might look for the structure of primary or secondary rules in his historical 
description of a society; or the historian of ideas, who should look the particular “rule of 
recognition” or “criteria of validity” present in the particular idea of law of past thinkers or 
school of thought. Of course, there is a relationship of two ways, since those results might 
have impact in our jurisprudence (it might happen that our concepts are wrong, and must 
be revised in the light of better evidence). Something similar happen with other 
jurisprudential developments: if we accept the claim that laws performs important social 
                                                     
67 Richard A Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 3. 
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functions, such as providing coordination’s that otherwise will be impossible; critical 
projects which equates law with violence, oppression or domination should be refined. It is 
not generally truth that every law of every legal system is oppressive as some critical 
approaches suggest (for instance, traffic rules merely coordinates conduct). And there are 
other examples, but unfortunately they are not as numerous as one would expect.  
This quick and somewhat naïve view of the utility of jurisprudence is not immune to 
criticism (Leiter surely can raise several objections, based in his naturalistic view of the 
continuity between philosophy and science), but it is surely sufficient for the weak position 
I am defending here. My claim is that abandoning the Demarcation Problem does not imply 
that we should tackle practical questions directly. In the alternative position I suggest, 
philosophy of law produce results and engages in dialogues with other branches of inquiry 
and research. This view can also be stated using Marx’s second thesis against Feuerbach: 
Since philosophy should be connected with the practice, we must reject the strongest forms 
of the orthodox view, which transforms jurisprudence in a purely scholastic enterprise. But, 
on the other hand, the “practice” in which general jurisprudence is interested is not the 
practice of law. As a form of conceptual philosophy, the practice in which jurisprudence is 
embedded is the practice of “advancing knowledge”.  
III. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have advanced an attempt to respond to Leiter’s sceptic case against the 
Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. The objected argument, in a nutshell, runs as 
follows: (1) Leiter diagnoses that of the Demarcation Problem is the concern of 
jurisprudence, and that legal positivist solution to such problem, which advocates an 
account of the nature of law in terms of set of essential and necessary conditions, is the 
best answer available. (2) He criticizes the positivist solution, since artefacts such law and 
science (where a similar project of demarcating science from pseudo-science was also 
attempted and failed) are resistant to such analysis in terms of necessary of sufficient 
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conditions. (3) Finally, since the whole point of demarcating from law is in fact the practical 
concern of guiding the action of legal officials and citizens; Leiter proposes that 
jurisprudence should tackle directly, without any jurisprudential dressing, the questions 
about what ought to be done in legal cases. 
In this paper, I have provided of a careful consideration of Leiter’s provocative argument. I 
suggested, contra (1), that the main of jurisprudence should be better characterized as 
constructing positive theory of law, not demarcating law from morality. Contra (2), I argued 
that positive jurisprudential theories (or responses to the Demarcation Problem, for Leiter) 
does not have to take the form of classic conceptual analysis in terms of sets of essential 
and necessarily conditions. There exist other options available for the jurisprudence, which 
constitute the challenges that the jurisprudent should explore. Finally, contra (3), I claimed 
that relevance of solving the fundamental problem of philosophy of law is not guiding the 
action of legal officials and citizens, but instead providing knowledge relevant to other areas 
of research.  
I have accepted, however, Leiter’s conclusion about the abandonment of the Demarcation 
of our jurisprudential concerns. The disagreement lies in the upshot of such abandonment. 
While for Leiter the result is that we must to replace the main problem of conceptual 
jurisprudence for the discussion of practical questions; my views is that the rejection of the 
Demarcation Problem challenges us to refine jurisprudence. In this sense, I hope that claims 
could be better read, not only as modest set of objections and comment against Leiter’s 
position, but also as a very much draft of plea for a renewed research agenda of 
jurisprudence.  
 
 
